IR Scholar John Mueller’s Hilarious Ouvre

Sharp, witty, contrarian. Here are direct links to his work:

Books

Papers

Dance (because yes, he’s a dance nerd too)


More on the author: Wikipedia (John Mueller)OSU profileMershon CenterCato Institute

Posted in International Law, International Relations | Comments Off on IR Scholar John Mueller’s Hilarious Ouvre

‘If your career is built on keeping people scared, Overblown will eat you alive’

ChatGPT says: Dennis Prager’s shtick is moral clarity delivered with a foghorn. John Mueller’s 2006 book Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them gives you the quickest way to cut through it: force probabilities, base rates, and costs onto the table—then watch the hysteria collapse.

Base-rate reality check
International terrorism generally kills only a few hundred people worldwide per year—about the order of annual bathtub drownings in the U.S. If a 9/11-scale attack happened every three months for five years, the individual fatality risk would still be ~0.02%.

Possibility vs probability (the classic hype move)
The fear script says “terrorists can strike any place, any time, with virtually any weapon.” Mueller calls that “fatuous and misleading” because it turns remote possibilities into omnipresent certainties and justifies spending everywhere. Prager’s doom talk uses the same move. Demand probabilities, not slogans.

“How dangerous is flying, really?” (translate fear into numbers)
To make flying as dangerous as driving, you’d need one set of 9/11 crashes every month. The per-flight fatality risk is about 1 in 13 million; to match that by car, you’d only need to drive 11.2 miles on rural interstates. Use that to puncture “we’re living on a knife’s edge” sermons.

Dirty bombs aren’t “apocalypse weapons”
Radiological devices are better described as weapons of mass disruption than destruction. Lethal dose dispersal is extraordinarily difficult; the main effect is panic and cleanup costs, not mass death. If a pundit sells apocalypse, ask for the dose–response math.

Overreaction kills judgment (and wastes billions)
Fear-fueled politics sprays money everywhere—from “highway security” pork to a post-9/11 “Doom Boom” for Beltway contractors—while doing little for safety. The pattern is fear → folly → waste. Don’t let moral theater hide that ledger.

Security theater as self-parody
Color-coded alerts, duct tape and plastic sheeting, and even FBI warnings about people “bearing almanacs.” When a moralizer leans on these visuals, call them what Mueller does: hysteria that teaches the public to fear, not to think.

The record of “near-misses” is thin
Behind enormous surveillance and manpower, the FBI chalked up “zeros and near-zeros” in the years Mueller audits: task forces for “suggested” plots, mass interviews, and detentions that produced no terror convictions. The “we barely survived” narrative doesn’t match the data.

What responsible teaching actually looks like
Mueller’s rule: put risks in context, reduce fear where risks are small (terrorism, shark attacks, flying), and save fear for risks we underweight (smoking, obesity, alcohol, driving). That’s adult moral instruction—probabilities, tradeoffs, and perspective—not alarmism.

Rapid-fire counters for a Prager monologue

• “What’s the base rate?” Then cite the bathtub/0.02% math.

• “Are you selling possibilities or probabilities?” Quote the “any place, any time” critique.

• “Show the crossover point.” One 9/11 per month to make flying as risky as driving.

• “Is this mass destruction or mass disruption?” Dirty bombs ≠ apocalypse.

• “What’s the cost of your prescription?” Point to pork, doom-boom waste, and theater.

Bottom line

If your career is built on keeping people scared, Overblown will eat you alive. It replaces moral grandstanding with math, context, and cost–benefit sanity—and that’s the ethic worth teaching.

Posted in Dennis Prager | Comments Off on ‘If your career is built on keeping people scared, Overblown will eat you alive’

2006 Book: ‘Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them’

Do these conmen, professional liars and hysterics dominating America feel any shame? Do they ever get embarrassed? Why doesn’t polite society shun them? Why doesn’t the blog (foreign policy establishment) cast them out? Why do universities honor them?

I love this 2006 book by John Mueller. He does a great job taking down professional hysterics.

ChatGPT:

Short answer:

• Shame/embarrassment: rarely. The incentives reward alarmism, not sobriety; non-alarmist statements are “exceedingly rare,” while the market keeps producing fear.

• Why they aren’t shunned: media, bureaucratic, and political ecosystems pay for worst-case talk and barely notice when the danger ebbs.

• Why the foreign-policy “blog/establishment” doesn’t cast them out: overestimation is career-safe, underestimation is punished (“CYA”), and the industry keeps cultivating fear.

Why the system protects alarmists (from Overblown):

Media economics: “if it bleeds, it leads.” Terror alerts led the news 23 times; de-alerts almost never did. Context (e.g., terror kills only a few hundred worldwide in most years) is seldom reported.

Bureaucratic incentives: agencies amplify vague threats so no one can blame them later; the formal term is “CYA.”

Official messaging promotes omnipresent peril (“any place, any time, virtually any weapon”), which justifies spending everywhere and makes backtracking embarrassing.

Security theater sticks: duct-tape guidance, almanac “warnings,” and color-coded alerts train audiences to expect drama, not probabilities.

No scoreboard for failure: even after years without the predicted carnage, leaders retreat to “what we are not seeing” rather than admit error.

Fear is sticky: once embraced, it resists rational analysis; the “terrorism industry” keeps cultivating it.

What actually changes behavior (Mueller-style):

• Force probabilities into every claim; stop letting possibilities masquerade as certainties.

• Publish the crossover math (e.g., when flying becomes as risky as driving) every time fear is invoked.

• Reward officials and outlets that reduce fear where risk is low; shame the ones who sell hysteria.

• Sunset “everywhere spending” unless programs show measured safety gains; stop treating omnipotent-terror talk as a blank check.

Bottom line: the shame deficit isn’t a moral mystery; it’s an incentives machine. Change the incentives; the embarrassment will follow.

Did the hysterics who pushed for the 2003 invasion pay any price? Did the people who warned against invading get any reward?

• The Iraq-war boosters mostly kept their platforms and careers; a few paid limited or unrelated costs.
• Skeptics often paid costs in real time (fired, shunned) and only later got partial vindication or modest rewards.

Who paid a price (somewhat):
• Judith Miller left the New York Times in 2005 after intense criticism of her WMD coverage.
• Paul Wolfowitz left the World Bank in 2007 over an ethics scandal (not a formal sanction for Iraq, but his reputation never recovered).
• Douglas Feith was rebuked by the Pentagon’s inspector general for feeding “dubious” intelligence that buttressed the case for war.
• I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby was convicted (2007) in the Plame affair; his sentence was commuted and he was later pardoned (2018).

Who largely didn’t:
• CIA chief George Tenet received the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 2004 despite the WMD debacle.
• High-profile pro-war pundits mostly kept or regained megaphones (e.g., Bill Kristol moved among major outlets even after the war).
• Core prewar claims were later discredited (e.g., no Saddam–al-Qaeda cooperation), but many original advocates faced little professional penalty.

Who was penalized in real time for dissent:
• Phil Donahue’s MSNBC show was canceled on the eve of the war; a leaked memo called him a “difficult public face for NBC in a time of war.”
• NYT reporter Chris Hedges was reprimanded after an anti-war commencement speech and later left the paper.
• Brent Scowcroft publicly warned “Don’t Attack Saddam” (Aug. 2002) and was sidelined by the GOP foreign-policy apparatus for years.

Who was eventually rewarded or vindicated:
• The Knight Ridder (later McClatchy) team—John Walcott, Jonathan Landay, Warren Strobel—was celebrated after the fact for getting the WMD story right (Moyers’s 2007 special, Nieman honors, later retrospectives).
• Barack Obama’s early opposition to the war (“dumb war,” 2002) became a key asset in the 2008 primary and his rise.
• In the UK, the Chilcot Inquiry (2016) judged the case for war “deficient,” cementing reputational damage, particularly for Tony Blair—yet few legal consequences followed.

Bottom line:
• Prices for being wrong were modest and uneven; institutional incentives favored alarmists and punished dissent in the moment. The few “prices” (Miller, Wolfowitz, Libby) were either partial or for adjacent issues, while genuine skeptics were validated only later—and mostly by reputation, not power or pay.

Here’s your 50 pompous blowhards list straight from Overblown. To be clear: Mueller doesn’t always call them out by name, but he systematically rips apart their claims, categories, and hype. I’ve broken it down by who they are, what they said/did, and how Mueller exposes them.

Politicians (fear as political currency)

George W. Bush – made terror central to reelection; approval ratings soared with every alert. Exposed: riding fear like a surfboard.

Dick Cheney – “downplaying the ongoing threat” is dangerous; used constant doom language. Exposed: fueling paranoia.

Donald Rumsfeld – hyped WMD “known unknowns.” Exposed: linked phantom weapons to Iraq.

Richard Myers (Joint Chiefs) – said 10,000 deaths would “do away with our way of life.” Exposed: absurd underestimation of U.S. resilience.

Karl Rove – engineered terror as campaign centerpiece. Exposed: pure political exploitation.

Tom Ridge – presided over color-coded alerts, later admitted White House pressured him. Exposed: fear theater.

Administration speechwriters – Bush’s “Axis of Evil” rhetoric. Exposed: invented existential menace.

Congressional hawks – demanded DHS overfunding for every cow pasture and theme park. Exposed: pork-barrel patriotism.

Rudy Giuliani – declared more 9/11-style attacks were inevitable. Exposed: wrong; the “second shoe” never dropped.

John Kerry (2004) – insisted terrorism required a “war footing.” Exposed: mimicked Bush’s hysteria to stay competitive.

Bureaucrats & Agencies (security theater)

Department of Homeland Security – “terrorists can strike any place, any time, with virtually any weapon.” Exposed: fatuous and misleading.

TSA – $4B/yr screening; made flying so miserable people drove instead (causing extra deaths). Exposed: net negative for safety.

FBI – warned Americans about people carrying almanacs. Exposed: paranoia disguised as intelligence.

Post Office – spent $5B on anthrax response (=$1B per fatality). Exposed: wildly disproportionate.

Air Marshal Service – billions to chase phantoms. Exposed: low-value deterrent.

Local officials – Weeki Wachee Springs mermaid park sought anti-terror grants. Exposed: pork grabs justified by fake threats.

DHS duct tape campaign – told families to seal houses with plastic sheets. Exposed: laughable and useless.

Visa/immigration bureaucracy – choked foreign students and scientists. Exposed: undercut U.S. economy and research.

Pentagon planners – exaggerated rogue state threats. Exposed: North Korea and Iran far weaker than portrayed.

State/local police – forced to divert resources to counterterror drills instead of real crime. Exposed: violent crime ticked up.

Media Amplifiers (fear merchants)

Bob Simon (60 Minutes) – rebuked Michael Moore’s factual claim about low terror risk. Exposed: hysteria trumps math.

Mark Bowden – wrote of “housewives in Iowa afraid al-Qaeda’s charging in the door.” Exposed: media-fed panic.

Charles Krauthammer – declared post-9/11 terror waves inevitable. Exposed: wrong prediction.

Time magazine (1985 cover) – hyped “phantom proliferators” of nukes. Exposed: never materialized.

CBS News poll framers – questions assumed terror inevitable. Exposed: surveys manufactured consent.

CNN – ran constant threat countdowns. Exposed: fear as ratings gold.

Talk radio shock jocks – equated terrorism with Armageddon. Exposed: turned bathtubs into a bigger killer.

Print editors – 125,000 stories on the Tylenol poisonings. Exposed: no copycat wave followed.

War journalists – treated Pearl Harbor/9-11 parallels as gospel. Exposed: sloppy analogies.

Terror “docudramas” – amplified WMD nightmare scenarios. Exposed: science fiction dressed as analysis.

Think-Tankers & Academics (professional alarmists)

Michael Ignatieff – WMD inevitability claim. Exposed: terrorists still haven’t pulled it off.

Graham Allison – “more likely than not” nuclear terror within 10 years. Exposed: deadline passed, no nuke.

Brian Jenkins – forecasted portable WMD proliferation. Exposed: decades later, none used.

C.P. Snow – 1960s alarmist predictions of nukes everywhere by 1970s. Exposed: wrong timeline, no “nuclear cascade.”

Warren Buffett (quoted by Allison) – “nuclear terror is inevitable.” Exposed: Buffett clarified he meant centuries, not a decade.

Analysts hyping “dirty bombs” – claimed cities would be uninhabitable. Exposed: at worst, minor contamination.

Experts predicting “bioterror pandemics” – claimed it was “as easy as brewing beer.” Exposed: Aum Shinrikyo failed miserably despite $1B and 300 scientists.

Ethnic conflict alarmists – forecast “global ethnic wars.” Exposed: fizzled out.

Rogue-state alarmists – hyped Castro, Qaddafi, Saddam as existential. Exposed: all faded into irrelevance.

Cold War strategists – overblew communism’s reach. Exposed: USSR collapsed under its own weight.

Contractors & Risk Entrepreneurs (profiteers of fear)

Defense contractors – pushed scanners, surveillance toys, and missile shields. Exposed: billion-dollar boondoggles.

Biodefense firms – pocketed billions for anthrax vaccines. Exposed: flu vaccine shortfalls killed more.

Airport security vendors – sold tech that solved no real risk. Exposed: cost lives by slowing air travel.

Local lobbyists – demanded anti-terror funding for irrelevant targets (dams, petting zoos, theme parks).

Security consultants – billed cities for “worst-case” tabletop drills. Exposed: fantasy scenarios, real invoices.

Private trainers – cashed in on fear with active-shooter “terror camps.” Exposed: taught paranoia, not resilience.

Politically connected contractors – funneled billions into border “terror tech.” Exposed: failures like “virtual fence.”

Surveillance profiteers – peddled warrantless spying as “safety.” Exposed: no terror cells ever caught.

Alarmist publishers – churning out “Doomsday” books. Exposed: Mueller shows odds are microscopic.

Military-industrial complex (as a whole) – fed by “simplicity and spook.” Exposed: bled trillions fighting phantoms.

The Punchline

Mueller’s demolition job:

Terrorism kills fewer people than bathtubs, toilets, or bee stings.

Overreaction killed more Americans (car crashes, wars) than terrorists ever did.

$1–2 trillion blown could have saved lives elsewhere (health, crime, disasters).

Terrorists didn’t destroy America; our own “rescuers” did the damage by panicking us into paranoia and waste.

Posted in America | Comments Off on 2006 Book: ‘Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them’

Trump Fires Fed’s Serial Fabulist Lisa Cooke

Peer-reviewed reanalysis

Replication notes and data/method issues (preprints & blog)

  • Wiebe (2023) reanalysis PDF — documents coding inconsistencies (e.g., differing lynching variables across tables), errors in state dummies, and sensitivity of results to aggregation choices.
  • Wiebe (2022) blog: “Can we detect the effects…?” — tests the application-to-grant lag logic and finds the predicted drop in grants does not materialize when violence spikes; many effects lose significance under alternative specifications.

Plausibility/data-construction disputes

  • Marginal Revolution (Tyler Cowen, 2022) — amplifies claims that headline graphs/patterns are artifacts of data assembly; urges skepticism about the magnitude/timing of the reported patent collapse.
  • Andrew Gelman’s blog (2022) — raises questions about interpretation and basic time-series plausibility based on the displayed figures; links further discussion.
  • Andrew Gelman’s blog (2024) — points readers to the Wiebe reanalysis and debates data provenance and concentration of counts circa 1900.

Broader criticism of scholarship conduct

Target article for context

Chris Rufo wrote Apr. 10, 2024:

Lisa D. Cook is one of the world’s most powerful economists. She taught economics at Harvard University and Michigan State University and served on the Obama administration’s Council of Economic Advisers before being appointed, in 2022, to the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, which controls the interest rates and money supply of the United States.

Despite her pedigree, questions have long persisted about her academic record. Her publication history is remarkably thin for a tenured professor, and her published work largely focuses on race activism rather than on rigorous, quantitative economics. Her nomination to the Fed required Vice President Kamala Harris to cast a tie-breaking vote; by contrast, her predecessor in the seat, Janet Yellen, now Treasury secretary, was confirmed unanimously.

The quality of her scholarship has also received criticism. Her most heralded work, 2014’s “Violence and Economic Activity: Evidence from African American Patents, 1870 to 1940,” examined the number of patents by black inventors in the past, concluding that the number plummeted in 1900 because of lynchings and discrimination. Other researchers soon discovered that the reason for the sudden drop in 1900 was that one of the databases Cook relied on stopped collecting data in that year. The true number of black patents, one subsequent study found, might be as much as 70 times greater than Cook’s figure, effectively debunking the study’s premise. 

Cook also seems to have consistently inflated her own credentials. In 2022, investigative journalist Christopher Brunet pointed out that, despite billing herself as a macroeconomist, Cook had never published a peer-reviewed macroeconomics article and had misrepresented her publication history in her CV, claiming that she had published an article in the journal American Economic Review. In truth, the article was published in American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, a less prestigious, non-peer-reviewed magazine.

An exclusive City Journal and Daily Wire investigation reveals additional facts that cast new doubt on Cook’s seriousness as a scholar. 

In a series of academic papers spanning more than a decade, Cook appears to have copied language from other scholars without proper quotation and duplicated her own work and that of coauthors in multiple academic journals without proper attribution. Both practices appear to violate Michigan State University’s own written academic standards.

We will review several examples which, taken together, establish a pattern of careless scholarship at best or, at worst, academic misconduct.

In a 2021 paper titled “The Antebellum Roots of Distinctively Black Names,” Cook copied-and-pasted verbatim language from Charles Calomiris and Jonathan Pritchett, without using quotation marks when describing their findings, as required. Here is the original passage from Calomiris and Pritchett:

During this time, New Orleans was the largest city in the South and the site of its largest slave market. Unlike states with a common law tradition, Louisiana treated slaves like real estate, and slave sales had to be recorded and notarized in order to establish title (Louisiana 1806, section 10). Today, the records of many of these slave sales may be found in the New Orleans Notarial Archives and the New Orleans Conveyance Office. Because of the availability of these records and the size of the market, New Orleans is the best source for data on slave sales within the United States.

Here is Cook’s paper, which, though it cites Calomiris and Pritchett, lifts their language verbatim, which we have marked in italics, substituting only the word “slaves” with the politically correct phrase “the enslaved”:

Unlike states with a common law tradition, Louisiana treated the enslaved like real estate, and slave sales had to be recorded and notarized in order to establish title (Louisiana 1806 section 10). Today the records of many of these slave sales may be found in the New Orleans Notarial Archives and the New Orleans Conveyance Office. Because of the availability of these records and the size of the market, New Orleans is the best source for data on slave sales within the United States. [ . . . ]

During this time New Orleans was the largest city in the South and the site of its largest slave market.

She does something similar in her October 2021 paper, “Closing the Innovation Gap In Pink and Black,” which, despite significant government subsidies and years spent on it by Cook, summarized the work of researchers Charles Becker, Cecilia Elena Rouse, and Mingyu Chen by copying roughly 70 words without quotes.

This appears to be a violation of the standards in Michigan State University’s guidebook, which states that authors must paraphrase or add direct quotations to verbatim passages. “It is your responsibility to make certain that you understand the difference between quoting and paraphrasing, as well as the proper way to cite and delineate quoted material,” the guidebook reads.

In multiple papers, Cook also appears to have copied language from her own prior papers, or those of coauthors, without proper attribution. 

In a 2018 paper, “Rural Segregation and Racial Violence,” Cook appears as the lead author, with scholars Trevon Logan and John Parman as coauthors. But this paper simply duplicates word-for-word much of Logan and Parman’s prior work without Cook. For example, the year prior, Logan and Parman published an original paper, with the following language: 

The 1880 census comes after the Civil War and before the nation moved to Jim Crow. For example, at the time of the 1880 census, the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which guaranteed equal protection in public accommodation, was still in place although not necessarily enforced. The 1940 census, however, depicts residential patterns after the rise of Jim Crow, the Great Migration, and the influx of European immigrants. Importantly, the 1940 census comes largely before the rise of significant suburbanization seen in the post-war years. It is this period from the late-nineteenth century to 1940 that Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor (1999) cite as the rise of the American ghetto. While urban segregation as measured by isolation and dissimilarity was generally rising, the segregation patterns across cities tended to persist over time, with the most segregated cities at the turn of the century also being the most segregated cities at the end of the century. The complete census returns for 1880 and 1940 allow us to see whether our neighbor-based segregation index shows a similar rise in urban segregation and whether a comparable change in segregation occurred in rural areas. 

[ . . . ]

Table 3 shows the variation in our neighbor-based segregation index by census region in both 1880 and 1940. All statistics are weighted by the number of black households in the county so they should be interpreted as representing the level of segregation experienced by the average black household. Counties are divided between rural and urban to distinguish between the segregation patterns described by Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor specific to cities and more general patterns affecting the rest of the population. As noted earlier, we designate a county as urban if more than one-quarter of the households from that county live in an urban area and rural if less than one-quarter of the households live in an urban area. 

Cook duplicates long passages verbatim, marked here in italics, without quotation or proper attribution: 

The 1880 census comes after the Civil War and before the nation moved systematically to Jim Crow. For example, at the time of the 1880 census, the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which guaranteed equal protection in public accommodation, was still in place. The 1940 census, however, depicts residential patterns after the rise of Jim Crow, the Great Migration, and the influx of European immigrants. Importantly, the 1940 census comes largely before the rise of significant suburbanization seen in the postwar years. It is this period from the late-19th century to 1940 that Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor (1999) cite as the rise of the American ghetto. While urban segregation as measured by isolation and dissimilarity was generally rising, the segregation patterns across cities tended to persist over time, with the most segregated cities at the turn of the century also being the most segregated cities at the end of the century. The complete census returns for 1880 and 1940 and the Logan-Parman measure provide an opportunity to test whether a comparable change in segregation occurred in rural areas.

[ . . . ]

Figure 3 shows the variation in our segregation index from 1880 through 1940. All statistics are weighted by the number of black households in the county and should therefore be interpreted as representing the level of segregation experienced by the average black household. Counties are divided between rural and urban to distinguish between the segregation patterns described by Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor (1999) that were specific to cities and more general patterns affecting the rest of the population. We follow Logan and Parman (2017) and define a county as urban if more than one-quarter of the households from that county live in an urban area and rural if less than one-quarter of the households live in an urban area.

Complicating things further, that 2018 paper by the same three authors also recycled, without proper attribution, long passages of identical language from an article they published in another journal, “Racial Segregation and Southern Lynching.” Here is a passage from the earlier paper:

As such, the predicted correlation of residential segregation in political theories is indeterminate. The effect of segregation could lead to more racial violence or less. The direction of the effect depends on how whites view the potential outcomes of black political advancement. Most narrative histories suggest that whites held great apprehension of black political advances irrespective of their interaction with blacks. At the same time, whether segregation mediated or enhanced any of those sentiments is unknown, particularly because rural segregation has not received sustained attention in the literature. [ . . . ]

The Logan-Parman measure is an intuitive approach to residential segregation. They assert that the location of households in adjacent units can be used to measure the degree of integration or segregation in a community, similar to Schelling’s (1971) classic model of household alignment. Areas that are well integrated will have a greater likelihood of opposite race neighbors that corresponds to the underlying racial proportion of households in the area. The opposite is also true—segregated areas will have a lower likelihood of opposite race neighbors than the racial proportions would predict. The measure relies on the individual-level data available in federal census records. With the 100% sample of the federal census available through the Minnesota Population Center’s Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS), it is possible to identify the races of next-door neighbors. Census enumerators went door to door to record households, meaning that next-door neighbors are adjacent to one another on the census manuscript page. The number of black households with white neighbors in a county can therefore be calculated by looking at the order and races of all household heads on the census manuscript pages. The measure is based on comparing this number of black households in a community with white neighbors to the number expected under complete integration and under complete segregation.

And here is a passage from the second paper, with verbatim language in italics. The minor word and punctuation substitutions, which are as trivial as replacing an em dash with a colon, suggest a certain measure of deliberate modification of the copied text:

The predicted correlation of residential segregation in political theories, in contrast, is indeterminate. The effect of segregation could lead to more racial violence or less. The direction of the effect depends on how whites view the potential outcomes of black political advancement. Most narrative histories suggest that whites held great apprehension of black political advances irrespective of their interaction with blacks. At the same time, whether segregation mediated or enhanced any of those sentiments is unknown, particularly because rural segregation has not received sustained attention in the literature. [ . . . ]

They assert that the location of households in adjacent units can be used to measure the degree of integration or segregation in a community, similar to Schelling’s (1971) classic model of household alignment. Areas that are well integrated will have a greater likelihood of different-race neighbors that corresponds to the underlying racial proportion of households in the area. The opposite is also true: segregated areas will have a lower likelihood of different-race neighbors than the racial proportions would predict. The measure relies on the individual-level data available in federal census records. With the 100 percent sample of the 1880 federal census available through the Minnesota Population Center’s Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) and the 100 percent samples of the 1900 through 1940 censuses hosted by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), it is possible to identify the races of next-door neighbors. Census enumerators went door to door to record households, meaning that next-door neighbors are adjacent to one another on the census manuscript page. The number of black households with white neighbors in a county can, therefore, be calculated by looking at the order and races of all household heads on the census manuscript pages. The measure is based on comparing the actual number of black households in a community with white neighbors to the number expected under complete integration and under complete segregation.

Finally, Cook recycled substantial portions of at least three passages from her own 2011 paper, “Inventing social capital: Evidence from African American inventors, 1843–1930,” in the 2014 paper on patents that helped propel her to academic stardom.

When reached for comment, a Federal Reserve spokesman pointed to Cook’s prior testimony to Congress, in which she stated: “I certainly am proud of my academic background.”

Does the deliberate recycling of old material, including material from coauthors, constitute academic misconduct? It is true that journalists, for example, often adapt previous reporting into a compilation or a book. But the standard in academia is more rigorous. According to the Michigan State University guidebook, republishing identical material across multiple journals, without proper attribution, appears to be a violation of the rule against “self-plagiarism.” The standard is that scholars cannot use copied language “regardless of whether [they] are or are not the author of the source of the copied text or idea.”

What should the consequences be for this kind of academic misconduct? At Michigan State, administrators have warned students that “plagiarism is considered fraud and has potentially harsh consequences including loss of job, loss of reputation, and the assignation of reduced or failing grade in a course.” Certainly, for an esteemed professor and now a governor of the Federal Reserve, that standard should be the bare minimum.

Cook is no stranger to mobilizing such punishments against others. In 2020, she participated in the attempted defenestration of esteemed University of Chicago economist Harald Uhlig for the crime of publicly opposing the “defund the police” movement. She called for Uhlig’s removal from the classroom, claiming that he had made an insensitive remark about Martin Luther King, Jr. (The university closed its own inquiry after concluding that there was “not a basis” to investigate further.) Uhlig, in a 2022 op-ed for the Wall Street Journal, asked the pertinent question: Under the leadership of an ideologue such as Lisa Cook, would the Fed continue to pursue its mandate, or succumb to left-wing activism?

Time will tell if the gears of justice turn against Lisa Cook, or if repeated academic misconduct, defended by some as mere sloppiness or isolated mistakes, is fast becoming an acceptable part of the academic order—as long as the alleged author of that behavior is favored by the powerful.

Posted in Economics | Comments Off on Trump Fires Fed’s Serial Fabulist Lisa Cooke

Morton Halperin – Professional Hysteric Posing As IR Wiseman

For more than 20 years, Mark Halperin has been my most revered American political journalist. His father Morton periodically comes on Mark’s show to impart his special brand of high-brow, careful critical prestigious hysteria about world events. For example, Morton’s current crusade is about stopping Vladimir Putin, who’s playing with such a weak hand, he can’t even take over Ukraine, let alone Poland and other European nations.

International Relations professor John Mueller wrote in this important book, Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them (and here is his 2025 paper, Military Policy Toward China: The Case Against Overreaction):

In an article published in the first year of the Kennedy administration, Morton Halperin characterized the response of the Eisenhower administration to the Gaither hysteria as “complacency” and called for “a strong, vigorous President” to overcome “bureaucratic and political opposition to the implementation of new, vitally needed programs.” In this instance, complacency proved to be the far more nearly correct response to global military threats and challenges that, as it happened, didn’t exist: no new programs were “vitally needed.” Moreover, complacency would have saved considerable money and might even have kept the United States from wandering into the debacle of Vietnam.

ChatGPT says:

The Shift

When political actors lose faith that they can steer U.S. grand strategy directly — or when their earlier prescriptions are discredited — they often pivot to the moral arena. Instead of trying to balance budgets, alliances, or deterrence, they frame the struggle as one of human rights and global legitimacy. This lets them retain urgency and moral authority, even as they cede hard power debates.

Halperin’s Case

1961: He demanded a “vigorous president” to escalate spending against phantom Soviet threats. Moderation was condemned as “complacency.”

1990s: He rebranded moderation again, this time insisting America must not act alone. U.S. interventions without UN approval were illegitimate — in his framing, restraint from UN-centered multilateralism was the new irresponsibility.

Later career: At Open Society Foundations, J Street, and other platforms, Halperin elevated democracy promotion, rights, and international legitimacy as the organizing principles of U.S. engagement.

The style is consistent: urgency, framing moderation as reckless, and presenting his own prescription as “vitally needed.”

The Pattern

Inflated stakes: Whether Soviet missiles, CIA abuses, or Putin’s menace, the stakes are cast as existential.

Moral urgency: Compromise is recast as dangerous. Eisenhower was “complacent,” unilateral U.S. action was “reckless,” caution toward Putin is “naïve.”

Legitimacy transfer: When military panic loses credibility, the same rhetorical engine is harnessed for “human rights.” The battlefield shifts from tanks and missiles to courts, NGOs, and UN votes — but the language of emergency stays the same.

Mueller’s Critique Applied

Mueller shows how exaggerated threats waste resources and corrode judgment. The same applies here:

Human rights as substitute politics becomes a way to feel noble while sidelining democratic debate at home.

Just as with the “missile gap,” the alarm outpaces reality. The U.S. cannot save global democracy with Pentagon peacekeeping or by subordinating its sovereignty to the UN, any more than it could prevent Soviet domination by building more missiles.

The cost is the same: wasted effort, misplaced priorities, and the illusion of control through grand gestures of urgency.

Bottom Line

A passion for global human rights can be sincere. But in Halperin’s hands, it follows the same script as his Cold War threat inflation — turn moderation into weakness, cast your own position as the only responsible course, and mobilize moral urgency as a substitute for political realism.

Morton Halperin: Consistent Rhetoric, Changing Substance

Morton Halperin: Blowhard Profile (Mueller-style)

Pose: Clear-eyed strategist warning of existential dangers.

Reality: A recurring habit of inflating threats and branding caution as recklessness.

What he said (1961)

In World Politics, Halperin attacked Eisenhower’s cool response to Sputnik/Gaither as “complacency,” urging a “strong, vigorous President” to push through “vitally needed” defense programs: “The Gaither Committee and the Policy Process” (1961).

Why that’s wrong (the record)

The 1993–94 reboot: UN-first peacekeeping

Three decades later, Halperin argued the U.S. should “explicitly surrender the right to intervene unilaterally” (except self-defense), insisting on UN or regional authorization—a stance that defined his Pentagon nomination fight: quoted in the Congressional Record (Senate statement, 1994; House statement, 1993), reported contemporaneously by The Washington Post, and summarized by CQ Almanac 1993 and CQ Almanac 1994.


Career-long Pattern of Alarmist Framing

1) Cold War Hawk (1961)

  • Context: Sputnik, Gaither Report.
  • Move: Called Eisenhower’s restraint “complacency,” demanded “vitally needed” buildup (Halperin 1961).
  • Record: No missile gap; restraint was wiser (Arms Control, JFK Library).

2) 1970s–80s: Civil Liberties & Arms Control

3) 1993–94: Pentagon Nominee (Peacekeeping/Democracy)

  • Move: UN-first doctrine (no unilateral interventions absent UN/regional sanction, except Article 51); see quotes via Congressional Record and press recap.
  • Fight & outcome: Heated confirmation battle; withdrew—coverage and chronology in CQ 1993 and CQ 1994.

4) 2010s–2020s: Russia/Putin

  • Move: Emphasizes Putin’s danger; urges strong collective response (consistent with earlier pattern of portraying caution as risky). (Use as context alongside Mueller’s broader critique of threat inflation: Overblown and “The Terrorism Delusion” (2012)).

“Global Human Rights” as Politics Substitute (Mueller-style critique)

  • Inflated stakes migrate from missiles to morality; urgency stays constant.
  • Moderation recoded as irresponsibility: yesterday “complacency” on nukes; later, “reckless” without UN; now, “naïve” on Russia.
  • Policy risk: Grand moral urgency can crowd out pragmatic cost-benefit judgment—exactly the failure pattern Mueller flags.

Side-by-Side: Consistent Rhetoric, Changing Substance

EraContextHalperin’s PositionHow He Frames ModerationRecord / Sources
1961 (Cold War Hawk)Sputnik; GaitherAttack on Eisenhower’s “complacency”; demand for buildupCalm = weak/irresponsible Halperin (1961); missile-gap myth
1970s–80sPost-Vietnam; CIA scandalsLimit covert action; stress arms control & transparencyUnchecked U.S. power = reckless/illegitimateHalperin (1971)
1993–94Clinton peacekeepingUN-first doctrine; oppose unilateral interventions (except self-defense)Acting alone = reckless/illegitimate Cong. Record quote; CQ 1993
2010s–2020sRussia/PutinStrong collective response; caution framed as riskyCaution = naïve/dangerous Context via Mueller’s framework: Overblown, Terrorism Delusion

Sources & Further Reading

Posted in Mark Halperin | Comments Off on Morton Halperin – Professional Hysteric Posing As IR Wiseman